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Abstract: In this chapter, we present an approach using formal meth-
ods to synthesize reactive defense strategy in a cyber network, equipped
with a set of decoy systems. We first generalize formal graphical secu-
rity models–attack graphs–to incorporate defender’s countermeasures in a
game-theoretic model, called an attack-defend game on graph. This game
captures the dynamic interactions between the defender and the attacker
and their defense/attack objectives in formal logic. Then, we introduce a
class of hypergames to model asymmetric information created by decoys
in the attacker-defender interactions. Given qualitative security specifica-
tions in formal logic, we show that the solution concepts from hypergames
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and reactive synthesis in formal methods can be extended to synthesize ef-
fective dynamic defense strategy using cyber deception. The strategy takes
the advantages of the misperception of the attacker to ensure security spec-
ification is satisfied, which may not be satisfiable when the information is
symmetric.
Keywords: Attack Graphs, Hypergame, Formal Methods
6.1. Introduction
Cyber deception is a key technique in network defense. With cyber decep-
tion, the defender creates uncertainties and unknowns for the attacker. By
doing so, the attacker’s strategy in exploiting the system becomes less effec-
tive, thus, resulting in improved security and safety of the network. In this
chapter, we investigate a formal methods approach for synthesizing defensive
strategies in cyber network systems with cyber deception. We employ formal
security specifications to express a rich class of desired properties. For exam-
ple, a defender may need to satisfy a safety property in terms of preventing
the attacker from reaching critical data server. He may also need to satisfy a
liveness property stating that a service should eventually be provided to the
user after being made temporarily unavailable. Given formal security specifi-
cations, formal synthesis is to compute a defense strategy, if exists, with which
the defender can provably satisfy his specification against all possible actions
from the attacker.
Formal methods have been employed to verify the security of network sys-
tems. Formal graphical security models such as attack graphs [Jha et al., 2002]
and attack trees [Schneier, 2007] are used in model-based verification of system
security. An attack graph captures multiple paths that an attacker can carry
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out by exploiting vulnerabilities and their dependencies in a network to reach
the attack goal. Given an attack graph, the formal security specification can
be verified using model checking algorithms for transition systems [Baier and
Katoen, 2008]. An attack tree builds a tree structure that describes how the
attacker can achieve his goal by achieving a set of subgoals. The root of the
tree is the main attack goal and the leaves of the tree are elementary attack
subgoals. The internal tree nodes shows the logical dependency between sub-
goals at different levels of the tree. To incorporate defender’s counter-measures,
attack-defense trees [Kordy et al., 2010, 2014] are proposed to capture the de-
pendencies between actions and subgoals for both attacker and defender. These
models are used in verifying quantitative security properties in temporal logic
[Aslanyan et al., 2016, Hansen et al., 2017, Kordy and Wide l, 2018]. The ma-
jor limitation of attack trees is that it does not characterize network status
changes under the attack actions and thus may fail to generate some attack
scenarios. It is also noted that these formal graphical models do not capture
the asymmetric information between the attacker and the defender due to cy-
ber deception. Specifically, these models assume both defender and attacker
knows the game they are playing, while as with cyberdeception, the defender
intentionally introduces incorrect or uncertain information about the game to
the attacker.
Active deception [Jajodia et al., 2016] employs decoy systems and other
defenses, including access control and online network reconfiguration, to con-
duct deceptive planning against the intrusion of malicious users who have been
detected and confirmed by sensing systems. To design defense strategies with
deception, game theory has been employed [Hor, 2012, Al-Shaer et al., 2019,
Horak et al., 2019, Cohen, 2006, Zhu and Rass, 2018]. These game-theoretic
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models express the attacker and defender’s objectives using reward/loss func-
tions. In [Horak et al., 2019], a partially observable stochastic game is for-
mulated to capture the interaction between an attacker and a defender with
one-sided partial observations. The attacker is to exploit and compromise the
system without being detected and has complete observation. The defender is
to detect the attacker and reconfigure the honeypots. Hor [2012] consider the
case when the attacker has incomplete information and forms a belief about
the defender’s unit. Players employ Bayesian rules to update the belief about
the state in the game. Leveraging the attacker’s incomplete information, the
defender may mislead the attacker’s belief and thus his actions to minimize
the damage to the network measured by a state-dependent loss function. How-
ever, reward and loss functions are not expressive enough to capture more
complex qualitative defense/attack objectives studied in attack graph, such
as safety and temporally extended attack goals. These objectives can be cap-
tured succinctly using temporal logic [Manna and Pnueli, 1992]. When formal
specification is used in specifying defense objectives, there is a lack of formal
synthesis methods which employ cyber deception to ensure the security goals
are met.
We study the problem of formal synthesis of secured network systems with
active cyber deception. We view the interactions between the defender and the
attacker as a two-player game played on a finite graph. Combining the game
graph abstraction with the logical security specifications, we construct a model
of an attack-defend game as a game on a graph with temporal logic objectives
[Pnueli and Rosner, 1989, Chatterjee and Henzinger, 2012]. This game includes
both the controllable and uncontrollable actions to represent the actions and
exploits by the defender and the attacker, respectively.
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In such a game between a defender and an attacker, the attacker plays
with incomplete information, if he does not know the locations of honeypots.
Furthermore, if the attacker mistakes a honeypot as a critical host, then we
say that he has a misperception about the game. We extend the theory of
hypergame to reason about the asymmetric incomplete information between
players and to enable synthesis of deceptive strategies. A hypergame [Bennett,
1980, Vane, 2000, Kovach et al., 2015] is a game of perceptual games, i.e., games
perceived by individual players given the information available to them and the
higher-order information known to them, i.e., what the player knows about the
information known to the opponent. Based on the hypergame modeling, the
key questions are: how will the attacker carry out his attack mission, given his
incomplete or incorrect information? And, how to synthesize effective defense
strategies, which leverage the defender’s private information to ensure that the
defender’s logical security specifications are satisfied?
Our insight is that deception with honeypots can create a misperception
about the labeling function of the attack-defend game. A labeling function re-
lates an outcome—a sequence of states in the game graph—to the properties
specified in logic. When honeypots are introduced, an attacker might mislabel
a honeypot as a critical host and pursue to reach it. Under this formulation,
our main algorithmic contribution is the solution of hypergames under label-
ing misperception and linear temporal logic objectives. Our solution approach
includes two steps: The first step is to synthesize the rational attack strategy
perceived by the attacker using solutions of omega-regular games [Chatterjee
and Henzinger, 2012, Zielonka, 1998]. The synthesized strategy serves as a pre-
dictive model of the attacker’s rational behavior, which is then used to refine
the original game graph to eliminate actions perceived to be irrational from
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the attacker’s perspective. In the second step, a level-2 hypergame is solved,
yielding a deceptive defense strategy, if one exists, that ensures a specification
is satisfied with probability one, given the misperception of the attacker. A
case study is employed to illustrate how to apply the game-theoretic reasoning
to synthesize deceptive strategies.
We structure the remainder of the chapter so as to provide rigorous math-
ematical treatment of the topic for a reader familiar with formal methods, and
support it with elaborate descriptions, discussions and examples to illustrate
our approach to a reader new to the area.
6.2. Attack-Defend Games on Graph
In this section, we introduce a model, called An Attack-Defend (AD) Game
on a Graph, that augments the attack graph model with the defense actions
available to the defender. Our AD game on graph model resembles the game
on graph model, which is commonly used in reactive synthesis [Pnueli and
Rosner, 1989].
Formally, an AD game on graph can be written as a tuple G = 〈G,ϕ〉 where
the two main components are (i)G: a game arena, and (ii) ϕ: the Boolean payoff
function (Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) specification) of the defender. Let us
understand each of the component in more detail.
6.2.1. Game Arena
A game arena is a transition system with labels assigned to the states. It cap-
tures different configurations of the network and the actions that the attacker
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and the defender may use to change the current configuration. A configuration
of system is a set of state variables that jointly define the current state of the
system. For instance, a state variable may be a collection of the current host
compromised by the attacker, IP addresses of different hosts over the network,
an enumeration of services running over each host, or a list of users currently
accessing the hosts with their privileges (root, user, none). Suppose that there
are n state variables and we denote the i-th state variable as Xi, then the
domain of a state-space can be given by S = X1 ×X2 × . . . ×Xn. Given this
notion of state, we formally define a game arena as follows:
Definition 6.1(Arena): A turn-based, deterministic game arena between
two players P1 (defender, pronoun “he”) and P2 (attacker, pronoun “she”) is
a tuple
G = 〈S,A, T,AP, L〉,
whose components are defined as follows:
• S = S1 ∪ S2 is a finite set of states partitioned into two sets S1 and S2.
At a state in S1, P1 chooses an action and at a state in S2, P2 selects an
action.
• A = A1 ∪ A2 is the set of actions. A1 (resp., A2) is the set of actions for
P1 (resp., P2);
• T : (S1 × A1) ∪ (S2 × A2) → S is a deterministic transition function that
maps a state-action pair to a next state.
• AP is the set of atomic propositions.
• L : S → 2AP is the labeling function that maps each state s ∈ S to a set
L(s) ⊆ AP of atomic propositions that evaluate to true at that state.
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Figure 6.1: Configuration of the system.
The last two components of the game arena are related to the security
specifications.
We discuss an example to illustrate the above concept.
Example 6.1: Consider the system as shown in Fig. 6.1 consisting of three
hosts with platform diversity. Each host can hold up to two Virtual Machine
(VM)s with different operation systems and services. For a fixed configuration
of VMs, a fragment of the attack graph can be generated based on the set of
known vulnerabilities, as shown in Fig. 6.2a.
(a) A fragment of the attack graph corresponding to one fixed configuration.
(b) (A fragment of) the attack-defend game arena.
Figure 6.2: The comparison between the attack graph and the attack-defend
game arena.
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In reactive defense, the defender has detected the attacker is in host 0 and
can exploit the vulnerability to gain user access to host 1. In that case, the
defender can change the platform in host 1 to be VM3, for which the attack
action will not be effective. The interaction is then captured in the game on
graph, shown in Fig. 6.2. The action of the defender can also be stopping or
running a service at the managed endpoints, which are omitted. We distinguish
the set of states into square states at which the defender makes a move and
circle states at which the attacker makes a move.
6.2.2. Specifying the security properties in LTL
We consider qualitative formal specifications for defender and attacker objec-
tives. Different from quantitative utility functions in terms of costs, qualitative
logic formulas capture hard security constraints that the network defense sys-
tem must satisfy.
The defender has two types of goals, namely (i) operational objectives;
such as the services should eventually be available to the legitimate users, and
(ii) defense objectives; such as the attacker should never be able to compro-
mise servers with sensitive information. However, the intention of attacker is
often unknown. Thus, we consider the worst-case scenario where the attacker’s
objective is to violate the security goal of the defender.
We choose to express the security goal of the defender using LTL [Manna
and Pnueli, 1992]. LTL allows us to express the security properties of system
with respect to time. We shall now present the formal syntax and semantics
of LTL and then discuss several examples.
Let AP be a set of atomic propositions. Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) has
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the following syntax,
ϕ := > | ⊥ | p | ϕ | ¬ϕ | ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 | ©ϕ | ϕ1 Uϕ2,
where
• >,⊥ represent universally true and false, respectively.
• p ∈ AP is an atomic proposition.
• © is a temporal operator called the “next” operator (see semantics below).
• U is a temporal operator called the “until” operator (see semantics below).
Let Σ := 2AP be the finite alphabet. Given a word w ∈ Σω, let w[i] be the
i-th element in the word and w[i . . .] be the subsequence of w starting from
the i-th element. For example, w = abc, w[0] = a and w[1 . . .] = bc. Formally,
we have the following definition of the semantics:
• w |= p if p ∈ w[0];
• w |= ¬p if p /∈ w[0];
• w |= ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 if w |= ϕ1 and w |= ϕ2.
• w |=©ϕ if w[1 . . .] |= ϕ.
• w |= ϕUψ if ∃i ≥ 0, w[i . . .] |= ψ and ∀0 ≤ j < i, w[j . . .] |= ϕ.
From these two temporal operators (©, U ), we define two additional temporal
operators: 3 “eventually” and 2 “always”. Formally, 3ϕ = >Uϕ and 2ϕ =
¬3¬ϕ. For details about the syntax and semantics of LTL, the readers are
referred to [Manna and Pnueli, 1992].
Here we present some examples. Suppose root(2) is an atomic proposition
that the attacker has root privilege on host 2, then a safety property that
attacker never has root privilege on host 2 can be written in LTL as a for-
mula ϕ1 = 2¬root(2), which is read as “proposition root(2) is always false.”
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Similarly, a property that the attacker first gains a user privilege on host 1
and then a root privilege on host 2 can be expressed using an LTL formula
ϕ2 = 3 (user(1)∧3 root(2)), which is read as “eventually proposition user(1)
becomes true and then the proposition root(2) becomes true.” In general, it
is also possible to express properties such as recurrence (some event occurs
infinitely often) or persistence (some property eventually becomes true, and
remains true thereafter) using LTL. However, in this chapter, we restrict our-
selves to a sub-class of LTL called syntactically co-safe LTL (scLTL) [Kupfer-
man and Vardi, 2001]. Using scLTL we can reason about the reachability and
safety1 properties.
This concludes a brief introduction to the concept of AD games on graphs;
which do not model the asymmetric incomplete information available with
the players. In the next section, we extend the notion of hypergames that
incorporate the different perceptions that players may have due to incomplete
information available to them.
6.3. Hypergames on Graphs
A hypergame models the situation where different players perceive their inter-
action with other players differently, and consequently play different games in
their own minds depending on their perception. We consider the case where
the difference in perception arises because of incomplete and potentially in-
correct information. For instance, suppose a subset of nodes in the network
are honeypots, the attacker may mistake these to be true hosts. We formulate
1Safety and reachability are dual problems. Hence, reasoning about the safety objectives
can be done by reasoning about the dual reachability problem.
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a hypergame to model the interaction between the defender and the attacker
given asymmetric information.
First, let’s review the definition of hypergames.
Definition 6.2(Hypergame [Bennett, 1980, Vane, 2000]): Given two
players, a game perceived by player 1 is denoted by G1, and a game perceived
by player 2 is denoted by G2. A level-1 hypergame is defined as a tuple
HG1 = 〈G1,G2〉,
In a level-1 hypergame, none of the player’s is aware of other player’s percep-
tion.
When one player becomes aware of the other player’s (mis)perception, the
interaction is captured by a level-2 two-player hypergame, defined as a tuple,
HG2 = 〈HG1,G2〉.
where P1 perceives the interaction as a level-1 hypergame (as P1 is aware of
P2’s game G2 in addition to his own) and P2 perceives the interaction as the
game G2.
We refer to the games G1 (resp., G2) as P1’s (resp., P2’s) perceptual game
in level-1 hypergame, and HG1 as P1’s perceptual game in level-2 hypergame.
As P2 is not aware that she might be misperceiving the game, her perceptual
game in level-2 hypergame is still G2.
In general, if P1 computes his strategy by solving an (m − 1)-th level
hypergame and P2 computes her strategy using an n-th level hypergame with
n < m, then the resulting hypergame is said to be a level-m hypergame given
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as
HGm = 〈HGm−11 ,HGn2 〉.
Next, we show that by introducing honeypots, the attacker’s perceptual
game deviates from the actual game. This mismatch occurs in the labeling
function. Recall that a labeling function L assigns every state in the game
arena with a subset of atomic propositions that are true at that state. Let us
consider a network with decoys where attacker is not aware of which hosts are
decoys. Suppose p is a proposition that a host h is a decoy. Then, defender’s
labeling function, say L1, labels h correctly as a decoy. However, the attacker’s
labeling function, say L2, will incorrectly label h as a regular host. Given a
path ρ ∈ S∗ in the game arena, this path may satisfy the security specification
as L1(ρ) |= ϕ, in which case the defender obtains payoff 1 and the attacker
obtains payoff 0. However, due to misperception in the labeling, the attacker
may have L2(ρ) |= ¬ϕ and thus have a misperception of the payoff of the path.
We capture this misperception and asymmetric information using the new class
of hypergames, defined as follows:
Definition 6.3(A Hypergame on a Graph with One-sided Mispercep-
tion of Labeling Function): Let G1 = 〈S,A, T,AP, L1〉 be the game arena
as constructed by P1. Similarly, let G2 = 〈S,A, T,AP, L2〉 be a game arena as
constructed by P2 based on her perception. Let ϕ be the defense objective of
P1. Then, we construct two games G1 = 〈G1, ϕ〉 and G2 = 〈G2, ϕ〉. When P1
is aware of P2’s misperception, i.e. P1 knows L2 and, therefore, G2, we have
the model of their interaction as a hypergame of level-2,
HG2 = 〈HG1,G2〉,
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where HG1 = 〈G1,G2〉 is a hypergame of level-1 and is P1’s perceptual game.
P2’s perceptual game is G2. We say HG2 to be a hypergame on a graph with
one-sided misperception when the labeling function of P1 coincides with the
ground-truth labeling function, i.e. L1 = L.
6.4. Synthesis of Provably-Secure De-
fense Strategies using Hypergames
on Graphs
Given the hypergame model, we present a solution approach to automatically
synthesize a strategy for defender such that, for every possible action of at-
tacker, the strategy ensures that the security goals (i.e., ϕ) of defender are
satisfied. In order to understand the synthesis approach for hypergame, we
first look at the conventional solution approach used for a game on graph
[McNaughton, 1993, Zielonka, 1998].
6.4.1. Synthesis of Reactive Defense Strategies
Recall that in an AD game on graph model; G = 〈G,ϕ〉, we assume that the
information available to both players is complete and symmetric. Under this
assumption, the solution for game on graph can be computed by constructing
a game transition system and then using an algorithm to identify the winning
regions for the attacker and the defender.
Before we introduce the game transition system, let us visit the equivalence
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of an scLTL specification with a Deterministic Finite-State Automaton (DFA).
Definition 6.4(Specification DFA): A DFA is a tuple,
A = 〈Q,Σ, δ, I, F 〉,
where
• Q is a finite set of DFA states.
• Σ = 2AP is an alphabet.
• δ : Q×Σ→ Q is a deterministic transition function. The transition function
can be extended recursively as: δ(q, uv) = δ(δ(q, u), v) for some u, v ∈ Σ∗.
• I ∈ Q is a unique initial state.
• F ⊆ Q is a set of final states.
A word w = σ0σ1 . . . σn is accepted by the DFA if and only if δ(q0, w) ∈ F .
Given an scLTL specification ϕ, a DFA A is called a specification DFA when
every word w defined over the alphabet Σ that satisfies w |= ϕ is accepted by
DFA A.
Using this notion of equivalence between a scLTL formula and DFA, we
define the game transition system as follows:
Definition 6.5(Game Transition System): Let A = 〈Q,Σ, δ, I, F 〉 be
a DFA equivalent to the specification ϕ. Then, given G = 〈G,ϕ〉, the game
transition system, represented as G⊗A, is the following tuple:
G⊗A = 〈S ×Q,A,∆, (s0, q0), S × F 〉,
where
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• S ×Q is a set of states partitioned into P1’s states S1 ×Q and P2’s states
S2 ×Q;
• A = A1 ∪A2 is the same set of actions as labeled transition system G;
• ∆ : (S1 ×Q × A1) ∪ (S2 ×Q × A2) → S ×Q is a deterministic transition
function that maps a game state (s, q) and an action a to a next state (s′, q′)
where s′ = T (s, a, s′) and q′ = δ(q, L(s′)).
• (s0, q0) ∈ S × Q where q0 = δ(I, L(s0)) is an initial state of the game
transition system; and
• S × F ⊆ S ×Q is a set of final states.
The following theorem is a well-known result in game theory [McNaughton,
1993, Zielonka, 1998].
Theorem 6.1(Determinacy of Game on Graph): All two-player zero-
sum deterministic turn-based games on graph are determined.
Thm. 6.1 is a very important result because it provides us with a char-
acterization of the game state-space. It states that, at any state in the game
transition system, either the defender or the attacker has a winning strategy.
In other words, the state space of game transition system is divided into two
sets, one consisting of states from which the defender is guaranteed to satisfy
his security objectives, and the second consisting of states from which attacker
has a strategy to violate the defender’s objectives.
Example 6.2: We illustrate the game on graph using a toy example. Con-
sider a network system where the defender can switch between two network
topologies, giving rise to two attack graph under two network topologies (Shown
in Fig. 6.3). For simplicity, as the graph is deterministic, we omit the attack
16
action labels on the graph. Incorporating defender’s actions into the attack
0 1
2
3
(a) Attack graph under topology A.
0 1
2
3
(b) Attack graph under topology B.
Figure 6.3: The attack graphs under different network topologies.
graph, we obtain the arena of the game, shown in Fig. 6.4. A circle state (0, A)
can be understood as the attacker is at node 0, the network configuration is
A, and it is attacker’s turn to make a transition. A square state (1, A) can be
understood as the attacker is at node 1, the network configuration is A, and it
is defender’s turn to make a switch. A transition from circle (0, A) to square
(1, A) means that the attacker exploits a vulnerability on node 1 and reach node
1. The goal of the attacker is node 3. That is, if the attacker can reach any
of the square states (3, A) or (3, B), then she wins the game. The goal of the
defender is to prevent the attacker from reaching the goal. In this game, we
can compute the attacker’s strategy shown in Fig. 6.4 where red, dashed edges
indicate the choice of attacker. For example, if the attacker is at host 1 given
topology B, she reaches host 2. If the defender switches to A, then she will take
action to reach square (3, A). If the defender switches to B, then she will take
action to reach square (3, B). In this game, there is no winning strategy for the
defender given the initial state of the game. In fact, the winning region of the
defender is empty.
Now, let’s consider a different specification of the attacker: 3 (2 ∧ 3 3).
That is, the attacker must reach node 2 first and then node 3. The LTL formula
translates to DFA in Fig. 6.5. Given the new specification, we construct the
game transition system in Fig. 6.6. An example of transition (1, A, q0, circle)→
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0, Astart 1, A
1, A
1, B
2, A 2, A
3, A
2, B 2, B 3, B
Figure 6.4: The game transition system given topology switching with simple
attacker’s reachability objective.
q0start q1 q2
2
0, 1, 3 2, 0, 1
3
Figure 6.5: The automaton representing the attacker’s objective
(2, A, q1, square), where circle, square indicate the shapes of the nodes, is defined
jointly by (1, A, circle)→ (2, A, square), and q0 2−→ q1. Given this LTL task, the
winning strategy of the attacker is indicated with red and dashed edges. It is
noted that when the attacker is at node 1, she will not choose to reach 3 but to
reach 2, required by the new specification.
0, A, q0start 1, A, q0
1, A, q0
1, B, q0
2, A, q1 2, A, q1
3, A, q0
3, A, q2
2, B, q1 2, B, q1 3, B, q2
Figure 6.6: The game transition system for LTL co-safe formula 3 (2 ∧3 3).
The red edges are the attacker’s strategy.
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6.4.2. Synthesis of Reactive Defense Strategies
with Cyber Deception
When the attacker has a one-sided misperception of labeling function, as de-
fined in Def. 6.3, the defender might strategically utilize this misperception to
deceive the attacker into choosing a strategy that is advantageous to the de-
fender. To understand when the defender might have such a deceptive strategy
and how to compute it, we study the solution concept of hypergame.
Solution Approach A hypergame HG2 = 〈HG1,G2〉 is defined using two
games, namely G1 and G2. Under one-sided misperception of labeling function,
defender is aware of both games. Therefore, to synthesize a deceptive strategy,
the defender must take into account the strategy that the attacker will use,
based on her misperception. That is, the defender must solve two games: Game
G2 to identify the set of states in the game transition system G2 ⊗A that the
attacker perceives as winning for her under labeling function L2, and game G1
to identify the set of states in the game transition system G1 ⊗ A that are
winning for the defender under (ground-truth) labeling function L = L1. After
solving the two games, the defender can integrate the solutions to obtain a set
of states, at which the attacker makes mistakes due to the difference between
L2 and L. Let us introduce a notation to denote these sets of winning states.
• G1: P1’s winning region is Win1 ⊆ S ×Q and P2’s winning region is Win2 ⊆
S ×Q.
• G2: P1’s winning region is WinP21 ⊆ S×Q and P2’s winning region is WinP22 ⊆
S ×Q.
Figure 6.7 provides a conceptual representation partitions of the state-
19
Figure 6.7: Illustration of the partition given by different perceptual game.
space of a game transition system. Due to misperception, the set of states are
partitioned into the following regions,
• Win1: is a set of states from which P1 can ensure satisfaction of security
objectives, even if P2 has complete and correct information. Thus, P1 can
take the winning strategy pi1.
• WinP21 ∩Win2: is a set of states where P2 is truly winning, but perceives the
states to be losing for her; due to misperception. Thus, P2 may either give
up the attack mission or play randomly.
• WinP22 ∩Win2: is a set of states in which P2 is truly winning and perceives
those states to be winning. In this scenario, she will carry out the winning
strategy piP22 . However, this strategy can be different from the true winning
strategy pi2 that P2 should have played if she had complete and correct
information. This difference creates unique opportunities for P1 to enforce
security of the system.
To compute deceptive strategy, the defender must reason about (a) how
the attacker responds given her perception? and (b) how does the attacker
expect the defender to respond, given her perception? It is noted that given the
winning regions WinP21 (resp. Win
P2
2 ), there exists more than one strategies that
P2 perceives to be winning for P2 (resp. for P1). The problem is to compute
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a strategy for the defender pi∗1, if exists, such that no matter which perceptual
winning strategy that P2 selects, P1 can ensure the security specification is
satisfied surely, without contradicting the perception of P2.
Given P2’s perceptual game G2 = (S × Q,A,∆, (s0, q0,2), S × F ), there
can be infinitely many such almost-sure winning mixed strategies for P2 [Ber-
net et al., 2002], we take an approximation of the set of almost-sure winning
strategy as a memoryless set-based strategy as follows.
piP22 (s, q) = {a | ∆2 ((s, q), a) ∈WinP22 }. (6.1)
In other words, P2 can select any action as long as she can stay within her
perceived winning region WinP22 . Given the rational player 2, for a given state
(s, q), an action a that is not in piP22 (s, q) is irrational as it drives P2 from the
perceived sure winning region to the perceived losing region.
For a state (s, q) ∈ WinP21 ∩Win2, P2 perceives P1 to be winning under
labeling function L2, when she is truly winning under ground-truth labeling
function L. In this case, P1’s deceptive strategy should conform to P2’s per-
ceptual winning strategy for P1. Otherwise, P2 would know that she is misper-
ceiving the game when she observes P1 deviating from his rational behavior
in the perceptual game of P2. When P1’s action is inconsistent from what P2
perceives P1 should do, then P2 knows that she have misperception about the
game.
Again, we take an approximation of the set of P1’s almost-sure winning
strategy perceived by P2 as a memoryless set-based strategy as follows.
piP21 ((s, q)) = {a | ∆2((s, q), a) ∈WinP21 }. (6.2)
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Next, by removing P2’s actions from G1 that P2 perceives to be irrational
as well as P1’s actions that contradicts P2’s perception, we obtain a differ-
ent game. Now, we incorporate the knowledge of P1’s actions that P2 would
perceive to be irrational into the hypergame model. This results in a modified
hypergame model as defined below.
Definition 6.6: Given the games G1 = G1 ⊗ A constructed using the true
labeling function L and G2 = G2⊗A with P2’s misperceived labeling function
L2, the deceptive sure-winning strategy of P1 is the sure-winning strategy of
the following game:
HG = (S ×Q×Q,A, ∆¯, (s0, q0, p0),Win1 ×Q),
where the transition function ∆¯ is defined such that
• For (s, q, p) ∈ S1 × Q × Q \ (Win1 × Q), if (s, p) ∈ WinP21 , then actions
in piP21 (s, p) are enabled. Otherwise, all actions a ∈ A1 are enabled. For
each enabled action a, let ∆¯((s, q, p), a) = (s′, q′, p′) where s′ = T (s, a),
q′ = δ(q, L(s′)) and p′ = δ(p, L2(s′)).
• For (s, q, p) ∈ S2 × Q × Q \ (Win1 × Q), if (s, p) ∈ WinP22 , then actions
in piP22 (s, p) are enabled. Otherwise, all actions a ∈ A2 are enabled. For
each enabled action a, let ∆¯((s, q, p), a) = (s′, q′, p′) where s′ = T (s, a),
q′ = δ(q, L(s′)) and p′ = δ(p, L2(s′)).
• The initial state is (s0, q0, p0) where (s, q0) is the initial state in G1 and
(s0, p0) is the initial state in G2.
The transition function can be understood as follows. At a P1 state, when
P2 perceives a state (s, q, p) to be winning for P1, the permissive actions in
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piP21 of P1 are enabled at that state. Otherwise, P2 would assume that P1 may
choose any action from A1. Similarly, at a P2 state, when P2 perceives a state
to be winning for herself, she might choose any action from her permissive
action set piP22 . Whereas, if P2 perceives the current state (s, q, p) to be losing
for her, given her perception, she would choose any action from A2.
Lemma 6.1: The sure-winning strategy pi∗1 of the game HG in Def. 6.6 is
stealthy for any state (s, q, p) where (s, q) ∈ Win2 as it does not reveal any
information with which P2 can deduce that some misperception exists.
Proof. In P2’s perceived winning region WinP22 for herself, any strategy
of P1 is losing. Thus pi∗1 will not contradict P2’s perception. In P2’s perceived
winning region WinP21 for P1, an action, which is selected by pi
∗
1 (if defined for
that state), ensures that P1 to stay within WinP21 and thus will not contradict
the perception of P2. In both cases, P2 will not deduce the fact that there is
a misperception.
Example 6.3(Continued): Let us continue with the toy example and the
simple reachability objective 3 3 (eventually reach node 3). Suppose the node 2
is a decoy. Then the attacker’s labeling function L2 differs from the defender’s
labeling function L: L2((2, X)) = ∅ and L((2, X)) = decoy where X ∈ {A,B}.
As the attacker is to avoid reaching decoys, if she knows the true labeling L,
then at the attacker’s circle state (1, A) in Fig. 6.8, she will not choose to reach
node 2 (and thus the square state (2, A)). The attacker’s strategy given the true
labeling function is given in Fig. 6.8. In this game, the attacker has no winning
strategy to reach 3 from 0 in the true game as the defender can choose to switch
to topology B ((1, A, square)→ (1, B, circle)). However, with the misperception
on the labeling function, the attacker believes that she has a winning strategy
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from node 0 (see the attacker’s strategy in Fig. 6.4).
0, Astart 1, A
1, A
1, B
2, A 2, A
3, A
2, B 2, B 3, B
Figure 6.8: The game transition system and the attacker’s winning strategy
given that she is to reach node 3 and knows that node 2 is decoy.
Consider now the initial state is (1, A, circle), that is, the attacker has com-
promised node 1 and the current network topology is A. If the attacker knows
2 is a decoy, then she will choose to reach 3 deterministically. If the attacker
does not know 2 is a decoy, then she is indifferent to reaching node 2 or node
3, because in her perception, these two actions ensures that with probability
one, she can reach node 3 in finitely many steps. Given this analysis, it is not
difficult to see that (1, A, circle) is sure-winning for the attacker given the true
game, but positive winning for the defender given the perceptual game of the
attacker, with the incorrect labeling. Here, positive winning means that the de-
fender wins with a positive probability–that is, the probability when the attacker
makes mistakes (visiting decoy node 2) due to her misperception.
Finally, we construct the hypergame HG in Fig. 6.9 where the defender’s
objective is ¬pU decoy where p is an atomic proposition that evaluates true
when node 3 is compromised. The labeling functions are: For X ∈ {A,B},
L(1, X) = L2(1, X) = ∅, L(3, X) = L2(3, X) = {p} and L(2, X) = decoy
but L2(2, X) = ∅. The states (shaded, red) are when the attacker’s perceived
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q0start q1
q2
p
∅
decoy
>
>
(a)
(0, A), q0, q0start (1, A), q0, q0
(1, A), q0, q0
(1, B), q0, q0
(2, A), q2, q0 (2, A), q2, q0 (3, A), q2, q1
(3, A), q1, q1
(2, B), q2, q0 (2, B), q2, q0 (3, B), q2, q0
(b)
Figure 6.9: (a)The DFA for the defender’s objective ¬pU decoy. (b) The
game that P1 uses to compute deceptive sure-winning strategy. The red and
dashed edges are perceived winning actions of the attacker.
automaton state differs from the defender’s automaton state. For example,
((2, A), q2, q0, circle) means that the defender knows that the attacker reached
a decoy but the attacker is unaware of this fact.
6.5. Case Study
We consider a simple network system illustrated in Fig. 6.10.
Figure 6.10: A example of network system.
In this network, each host runs a subset Servs = {0, 1, 2} of services. A
user in the network can have one of the three login credentials credentials =
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Table 6.1: The pre- and post-conditions of vulnerabilities.
Vulnerability ID Pre- and Post- Conditions
0 Pre : c ≥ 1, service 0 running on target host,
Post : c = 2, stop service 0 on the target, reach target host.
1 Pre: c ≥ 1, service 1 running on the target host,
Post : reach target host.
2 Pre: c ≥ 1, service 2 running on the target host
Post : c = 2, reach target host.
Table 6.2: The defender’s options.
Host ID Services Non-critical Services
0 {0, 1, 2} ∅
1 {1, 0} ∅
2 {1, 2} ∅
3 {0, 1, 2} {0, 1}
4 {0, 1} ∅
5 {0, 1, 2} ∅
{0, 1, 2} standing for “no access” (0), “user” (1), and “root” (2). There are
a set of vulnerabilities in the network, each of which is defined by a pre-
condition and a post-condition. The pre-condition is a Boolean formula that
specifies the set of logical properties to be satisfied for an attacker to exploit the
vulnerability instance. The post-condition is a Boolean formula that specifies
the logical properties that can be achieved after the attacker has exploited that
vulnerability. The set of vulnerabilities are given in Table 6.1 and are generated
based on the vulnerabilities described in [Jha et al., 2002].
The defender can temporally suspend noncritical services from servers. To
incorporate this defense mechanism, we assign each host a set of noncritical
services that can be suspended from the host. In Table 6.2, we list the set
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of services running on each host, and a set of noncritical services that can be
suspended by the defender. Other defenses can also be considered. For example,
if the network topology can be reconfigured online, then the state in the game
arena should keep track of the current topology configuration of the network.
In our experiment, we consider simple defense actions. However, our method
extends to more complex defense mechanisms.
The attacker, at a given attacker’s state, can exploit any existing vulner-
ability on the current host. The defender, at a defender’s state, can choose
to suspend a noncritical service on any host in the network. The attacker’s
objective is expressed using scLTL formula
ϕ2 = ¬decoyU p2 ∧ ¬decoyU p5,
where pi means that the attacker has compromised host i and gained user or
root access on that machine. However, the attacker does not know the location
of the decoys. In this system, decoy is host 4.
The following result is obtained from hypergame analysis: at the initial
state, the attacker is at host 0 with user access.
• The initial state is perceived to be winning by the attacker.
• Assuming complete, symmetric information, the size of winning region for
the defender is 131.
• With asymmetric information, when the attacker plays a perceived winning
strategy, the size of winning region for the defender is 193–which is greater
than that with symmetric information.
• The defender has a winning strategy to prevent the attacker from achieving
her objective in the network, using the solution of the hypergame.
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It is noted that, using the winning region of the defender, we know for a
given initial state, whether the security specification is satisfied. For a different
initial state, for example, the attacker visited host 2 with user privileges, we can
directly examine whether the security is ensured by checking if the new initial
state is in the winning region for the defender. This set provide us important
insight to understand the weak points in the network, and can be used for
guide the decoy allocation.
6.6. Conclusion
The goal of formal synthesis is to design dynamic defense with guarantees on
critical security specifications in a cyber network. In this chapter, we intro-
duced a game on graph model for capturing the attack-defend interactions
in a cyber network for reactive defense, subject to security specifications in
temporal logic formulas. In reactive defense, the defender can take actions in
response to the exploit actions of the attacker. We introduced a hypergame for
games on graphs to capture payoff misperception for the attacker caused by
the decoy systems. The solution concept of hypergames enables us to synthe-
size effective defense strategy given the attacker’s misperception of the game,
without contradicting the belief of the attacker. There are multiple extensions
from this study: The framework assumes asymmetric information but complete
observations for both defender and attacker. It is possible to extend for defense
design with a partially observable defender/attacker. By examining the win-
ning region, it provides important insights for the resource allocation of decoy
systems.
28
Bibliography
Ehab Al-Shaer, Jinpeng Wei, Kevin W Hamlen, and Cliff Wang. Dynamic
bayesian games for adversarial and defensive cyber deception. In Au-
tonomous Cyber Deception, pages 75–97. Springer, 2019.
Zaruhi Aslanyan, Flemming Nielson, and David Parker. Quantitative Verifica-
tion and Synthesis of Attack-Defence Scenarios. In 2016 IEEE 29th Com-
puter Security Foundations Symposium (CSF), pages 105–119, June 2016.
doi: 10.1109/CSF.2016.15.
Christel Baier and Joost-Pieter Katoen. Principles of Model Checking (Repre-
sentation and Mind Series). The MIT Press, 2008. ISBN 978-0-262-02649-9.
Peter G Bennett. Hypergames: developing a model of conflict. Futures, 12(6):
489–507, 1980.
Julien Bernet, David Janin, and Igor Walukiewicz. Permissive strategies:
From parity games to safety games. RAIRO - Theoretical Informatics and
Applications, 36(3):261–275, July 2002. ISSN 0988-3754, 1290-385X. doi:
10.1051/ita:2002013.
Krishnendu Chatterjee and Thomas A Henzinger. A survey of stochastic
omega-regular games. Journal of Computer and System Sciences, 78(2):
394–413, 2012. ISSN 0022-0000. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jcss.2011.
05.002. Games in Verification.
Fred Cohen. The use of deception techniques: Honeypots and decoys. In
Handbook of Information Security 3.1. 2006.
Rene´ Rydhof Hansen, Peter Gjøl Jensen, Kim Guldstrand Larsen, Axel Legay,
and Danny Bøgsted Poulsen. Quantitative evaluation of attack defense trees
29
using stochastic timed automata. In International Workshop on Graphical
Models for Security, pages 75–90. Springer, 2017.
Karel Hor. Manipulating adversary’s belief: A dynamic game approach to
deception by design for proactive network security. 7638:273–294, 2012.
ISSN 03029743. doi: 10.1007/978-3-642-34266-0.
Karel Horak, Branislav Bosˇansky´, Christopher Kiekintveld, and Charles
Kamhoua. Compact representation of value function in partially observ-
able stochastic games. pages 350–356. International Joint Conferences on
Artificial Intelligence Organization, 2019. doi: 10.24963/ijcai.2019/50.
Sushil Jajodia, V. S. Subrahmanian, Vipin Swarup, and Cliff Wang. Cyber
deception: Building the scientific foundation. 2016. ISBN 9783319326993.
doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-32699-3.
S. Jha, O. Sheyner, and J. Wing. Two formal analyses of attack graphs.
Proceedings of the Computer Security Foundations Workshop, 2002-Janua:
49–63, 2002. ISSN 10636900. doi: 10.1109/CSFW.2002.1021806.
Barbara Kordy and Wojciech Wide l. On Quantitative Analysis of At-
tack–Defense Trees with Repeated Labels. In Lujo Bauer and Ralf Ku¨sters,
editors, Principles of Security and Trust, Lecture Notes in Computer Sci-
ence, pages 325–346, Cham, 2018. Springer International Publishing. ISBN
978-3-319-89722-6. doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-89722-6 14.
Barbara Kordy, Sjouke Mauw, Sasˇa Radomirovic´, and Patrick Schweitzer.
Foundations of attack–defense trees. In International Workshop on Formal
Aspects in Security and Trust, pages 80–95. Springer, 2010.
30
Barbara Kordy, Ludovic Pie`tre-Cambace´de`s, and Patrick Schweitzer. DAG-
based attack and defense modeling: Don’t miss the forest for the attack
trees. Computer Science Review, 13-14:1–38, November 2014. ISSN 1574-
0137. doi: 10.1016/j.cosrev.2014.07.001.
Nicholas S. Kovach, Alan S. Gibson, and Gary B. Lamont. Hypergame theory:
A model for conflict, misperception, and deception. Game Theory, 2015:
1–20, 2015. ISSN 2356-6930. doi: 10.1155/2015/570639.
Orna Kupferman and Moshe Y Vardi. Model checking of safety properties.
Formal Methods in System Design, 19(3):291–314, 2001.
Zohar Manna and Amir Pnueli. The Temporal Logic of Reactive and Concur-
rent Systems: Specification. Manna,Z.;Pnueli,A.:Temporal Logic of Reactive
Systems. Springer-Verlag, New York, 1992. ISBN 978-0-387-97664-8. doi:
10.1007/978-1-4612-0931-7.
Robert McNaughton. Infinite games played on finite graphs. Annals of Pure
and Applied Logic, 65(2):149–184, 1993.
Amir Pnueli and Roni Rosner. On the synthesis of an asynchronous reactive
module. pages 652–671, 1989.
Bruce Schneier. Attack Trees. http://www.schneier.com/paper-attacktrees-
ddj-ft.html, August 2007.
Russell Richardson III Vane. Using Hypergames to Select Plans in Competitive
Environments. PhD thesis, 2000.
Quanyan Zhu and Stefan Rass. On multi-phase and multi-stage game-theoretic
modeling of advanced persistent threats. IEEE Access, 6:13958–13971, 2018.
ISSN 21693536. doi: 10.1109/ACCESS.2018.2814481.
31
Wies law Zielonka. Infinite games on finitely coloured graphs with applications
to automata on infinite trees. Theoretical Computer Science, 200(1-2):135–
183, 1998. ISSN 03043975. doi: 10.1016/S0304-3975(98)00009-7.
32
